As more and more developed countries adopt policies that favor highly educated immigrants, the impact of such policies on developing countries remains unclear. Some researchers have argued that migrants who are more educated tend to bring their immediate family members to the host country, and thus, send less money to the source country in remittances. While there is numerous papers documenting association between education and remittance, whether that is related to sponsorship decision remains under-explored. Using individual level panel data from the New Immigrant Survey, we show that sponsoring family members leads to lower remittance. Furthermore, we show that college educated immigrants from high-income families are less likely to sponsor relatives, presumably because of relatively higher opportunity cost of migration of their relatives. Together, these two results suggest a positive association between education and remittances, which is indeed, what we find in the data. Our extended analysis shows that alternative explanations (such as higher income of more educated immigrants, or repaying implicit educational loans) cannot completely explain the positive association between education and remittances. Our results suggest that skill-based immigration policies are likely to result in more remittances.
Introduction
In recent years, more and more developed countries have adopted or are considering adopting skill-based immigration policies. For example, Canada now puts 37 per cent weight on educational credentials of prospective immigrants, compared to 17 per cent in 1986. Australia, UK, and New Zealand (among others) have adopted similar policies (Bedford, 2003; Spinks, 2010; Cerna, 2014) . In the U.S., President Trump has recently called for a "merit-based" immigration system citing the Canadian system as an example . Of course, these associations do not imply a causal relation. However, such possibilities have sparked a debate in both academic and policy circles.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between education and remittances, paying particular attention to the sponsorship decision (that is the decision of bringing family members to the host country) -an aspect of the remittance decision that has been largely ignored in the literature until now. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address this broad question about the relationship between education, sponsorship, and remittances. We use data from two rounds of the New Immigrant Survey (NIS), which is a nationally representative sample of newly admitted legal permanent residents (LPRs) to the U.S.
The NIS has several features, which greatly facilitate an analysis of remittance behaviour.
The most important feature of the survey is that it is a panel data, where same respondents were interviewed about five years apart. Therefore, we can use a difference in difference (DD) estimator with individual fixed effect (FE) to estimate the effect of sponsorship on remittances.
Our results suggest that sponsoring a relative leads to a $541 decline in the amount remitted per year. We also find that college educated immigrants from high-income families are 5.95 per cent less likely to sponsor relatives.
The inverse relationship between sponsorship and remittance, and the negative association between sponsorship and education suggest immigrants with a college degree may remit more than immigrants without a college degree. Indeed, that is what we find in our empirical analysis on the relationship between education and remittances. Our analysis also suggests that this positive association is not just an artifact of higher income of college-educated immigrants. We also find that pure investment motive is unlikely to be the primary explanation for the association between education and remittances. These results give us further evidence that the sponsorship decision plays a critical role in the relation between education and remittances.
The paper continues as follows: section two summarizes the existing literature, section three describes the data, section four shows estimation results including some robustness exercises, and section five concludes the paper.
Conceptual Framework

Remittances
Remittances have received considerable attention from researchers because of its role in increasing welfare (Lillard and Willis, 1997; Gerber and Torosian, 2013) , reducing poverty (Adams and Page, 2005; Taylor et. al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2009; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2013) , investing in human capital in recipient countries (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Carla et al., 2009; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010, 2013; Vania, 2014; Bouoiyour and Miftah, 2015) , reducing consumption uncertainty (Combes and Ebek, 2011) , developing the recipient countries (Giuliano and Arranz, 2009; Ratha, 2013) , insuring senders themselves(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006) or for the recipient households (Yang and Choi, 2007) , and reducing inequality (Garip, 2012 (Garip, , 2013 . Rapoport and Docquier (2006) discuss the major motives behind remittances. They discuss four individual motives: altruism, exchange, inheritance, and strategic; and two family arrangements: insurance and investment. Different motives predict different types of relationship between education and remittances (Bollard et al., 2011) . Empirical evidence on this issue is also mixed. Some studies find a negative relationship (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006; Niimi and Ozden, 2006; Faini, 2007; Adams, 2008; Niimi, Ozden and Schiff, 2010) ; while others find no relationship exists between education level and remittance flows (Rodriguez and Horton, 1994) .
On the other hand, a number of studies report a positive relationship between education and remittance (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Hoddinott, 1994; Lillard and Willis, 1997; Poirine, 1997; Ahlburg and Brown, 1998; Cox et al., 1998; Regmi and Tisdell, 2002; Cai, 2003; Bollard et al., 2011) . Docquier, Rapoport and Salomone (2012) find that the relationship between education and remittance depends on immigration policy of the host country. They find the effect of education on remittances is more likely to be positive when the policy is more restrictive and less skill-selective.
Sponsorship
Bringing family members to the host country (sponsorship 4 ) could be an alternative to sending remittances. This may mean loss of human capital for the source country. However, for labor surplus economies, it may also reduce unemployment and therefore possible unrest (Mendola, 2012) . A recent paper by Carr and Tienda (2013) find that an immigrant entering the U.S. during the early 1980s (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) sponsored 2.6 family members and that number went up to 3.45 for immigrants entering the U.S. during the late 1990s (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . The sponsorship decision has received relatively little attention from researchers Rosenzweig, 1986, 1989; Boyd, 1989; Yu, 2008 are some exceptions) despite its importance
5
. What is the relationship between 4 A legal permanent resident or a citizen can file a petition (or sponsor) to bring a relative to the U.S. Citizens are allowed to sponsor a broader class of relatives compared to legal permanent residents. We discuss more on this later. 5 Some researchers have explored related fields such as family or network effects in immigration decision (Borjas and Bronars 1991 among others) , other have explored the links between and migration and remittance (Rapoport and Docquier 2006; Garip 2013). education and sponsorship? Does sponsoring some family members mean less remittance for those who remain in source countries? These questions remain largely unexplored.
The conventional wisdom (as discussed in Faini 2007 ) is that more educated immigrants tend to bring more family members to the host country, which reduce the need for remittances.
There are two underlying assumptions in this assertion: 1) more educated immigrants are more likely to bring their relatives to the host country, and 2) more sponsorship leads to less remittance. The first assumption has some institutional justification but there is little empirical evidence for it. For example, U.S. immigration laws state that an individual planning to sponsor new immigrant must have an income (or liquid asset) that is above 125 per cent of the Federal Poverty Level (which is $30,375 for a family of four)
6
. Since immigrants who are more educated are more likely to earn more, they are more likely to meet the threshold. However, these income levels are low-enough and well below the median annual earnings of a high-school graduate
Furthermore, immigrants who are more educated may have family members with a higher opportunity cost of moving, presumably because they may have stable jobs or property in their source countries. As we mentioned earlier, despite some institutional justification, there is little empirical evidence for the first assertion. Bollard et al. (2001) do not find any difference in the family structures of immigrants with and without college degree. However, they do not discuss the issue of sponsorship. Jasso and Rosenzweig (2010) show that immigrants are more likely to sponsor their highly-educated children but send remittances to assist their less-educated
The second assumption built into the conventional wisdom is a behavioral one that has not been empirically verified. The assertion that more sponsorship leads to less remittance, while plausible, is not obvious. Jasso and Rosenzweig (2010) Kugler, Levinthal and Rapoport (2013) show that migration leads to an increase in cross-border financial flows by reducing incomplete information problem.
of additional dollars spent on each child, the immigrant sends more remittance to the children left behind in the source country. However, they did not empirically investigate that issue.
While the sponsorship has not attracted much attention, a number of theoretical and empirical papers have investigated the link between remittance and migration intentions. New
Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) approach suggests that remittances increase productivity (income) and relax credit constraints in the receiving countries (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Katz and Stark, 1986; Stark, 1991 does not necessarily mean that more remittance will actually increase migration (Epstein and Gang, 2006) . Even if some individuals are willing to migrate, in most cases, they still need a willing and able sponsor residing in the host country. Therefore, it is important to understand the decision process of potential sponsors (immigrants who are already LPRs or citizens) to complement the knowledge generated from the set of studies mentioned above.
Data
The A first check on this issue comes from Bollard et al. (2011) who compare 14 different datasets from 11 countries, including the NIS for the U.S. They find that (see Table 2 p.141) socio-demographic characteristics (such as education, income, family structure, number of years abroad, and return intention) of the NIS respondents are similar to their pooled sample. However, the NIS respondents are less likely to remit compared to immigrants in other data sets in their study. For a second check of the representativeness of the NIS respondents, we compare the original NIS sample from the first round and our analysis sample to the non-citizen sample from 2003 Current Population Survey (CPS). We only focus on the variables that are available in the CPS
11
. Appendix A1 shows the summary statistics for the three samples. Comparison of column 1 (CPS) and column 2 (largest possible Round 1 NIS sample with relevant variables; we refer to this as full sample) suggest that NIS full sample is comparable to CPS sample in age, gender, marital status, and employment rate. However, the NIS immigrants are more educated, have higher income, and have been in the U.S. longer than CPS immigrants. A comparison of columns 2 (NIS full sample) and 3 (our analysis sample) suggest that despite the attrition and sample restriction, our analysis sample is representative of full NIS sample (Appendix A2 suggests the same). Jasso and Rosenzweig (2010) also observed that despite the high attrition rate, the Round 2 NIS sample remained representative of the Round 1 sample. However, our analysis sample has a lower marriage rate in comparison with the NIS full sample.
The NIS includes data on a variety of topics, including demographics information, education levels, migration history and so forth. Our primary outcome variables are remittance and sponsorship. We obtain total remittance variable by adding all the cash and non-cash transfers Table 1a and 1b present the summary statistics for rounds one and two, respectively. We only discuss the summary statistics for the second round (Table 1b) Columns 2 and 3 present the summary statistics for remitters and non-remitters, respectively. They are also more likely to have a spouse (29.9% vs. 4.3%) or a child (27.8% vs. 9.8%) outside of the U.S., but they are less likely to have a parent outside of the U.S. (29.9% vs. 41.4%).
Results
In this section, we will provide empirical evidence to show how sponsorship creates a positive relationship between education and remittances. First, using a DD approach, we will show that sponsoring family members leads to lower remittances (Section 4.1). Next, in Section 4.2, we will show that college-educated immigrants from above-average income families have a significantly lower propensity to sponsor relatives suggesting that, the opportunity cost of migration for the family members of college-educated immigrants plays an important role in this process. These two results, together, suggest that college educated immigrants may send more money in remittances. Our empirical analysis in Section 4.3 confirms the positive association between remittances and education. In the extended analysis (Section 4.4.4), we show that alternative explanations (such as higher income of college educated immigrants or repaying implicit educational loans) cannot completely explain the positive association between education and remittances.
Sponsorship and Remittances
First, we estimate the effects of sponsorship on remittance using a DD method. Our treatment group consists of immigrants who have filed paperwork to sponsor a relative, and our comparison group consists of immigrants who have not. We observe the propensity to remit and the amount remitted before and after the sponsorship process for both groups. Therefore, we can implement a DD-FE estimator. DD estimators assume that in the absence of the treatment the trend in the treatment and control groups would have remained the same. Strictly speaking, we do not have a control group. The ideal control group would be immigrants who are otherwise similar to treatment group but randomly denied the opportunity to sponsor relatives. Such a group does not exist. Therefore, we rely on the current comparison group.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the propensity to remit for immigrants who sponsored a relative (the treatment group) and immigrants who did not sponsor a relative (the comparison group) in between two rounds of the interviews. In the before period (first round), 27.0 per cent of sponsors and 14.5 per cent of non-sponsors reported remitting. The difference is statistically significant. In other words, we observe a positive association between the probability of remitting and sponsorship. In the after period (second round), 14.5 per cent of sponsors and 9.5 per cent of non-sponsors report remitting, and the difference is statistically significant. Thus, the second round data also suggests a positive association between the probability of remitting and sponsorship. Comparing numbers across rounds, the decline among the sponsors was 12.4
percentage points. Conversely, the decline among the non-sponsors was 4.9 percentage points.
Therefore, the mean DD estimates suggest that sponsorship leads to a 7.5 percentage point decline in the propensity to remit. In other words, DD results suggest a negative relationship between the probability of remitting and sponsorship
13
.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the change in the average amount remitted. It shows that the sponsors, on an average, remit more money compared to non-sponsors, suggesting a positive association between sponsorship and amount remitted. However, comparing across rounds, we find that in the before period, average amount remitted by a sponsor was $1208.75 and it declined to $638.38 in the after period. In other words, the average amount remitted by a sponsor declined by a statistically significant $570.37, after they sponsored a relative. In comparison, the decline in the amount remitted by non-sponsors was only $72.17. Our mean DD estimate suggests that sponsoring a relative leads to a statistically significant $498.2 decline in the average amount remitted. Therefore, DD results suggest a negative relationship between the amount remitted and sponsorship.
Next, we use a first difference (FD) regression to study the relation between sponsorship and remittances (Table 3) . We include a number of time varying control variables such as dummies for college education, marital status, whether they have a spouse overseas, number of children, whether they have children overseas, whether they have at least one living parent, and whether the living parent is overseas. Theoretically, the time constant variables should be differenced out in a FD regression. We nonetheless include time constant variables (such as gender and country of origin) since the group specific trends may be different. Other control variables include dummy variables for immigrants' childhood family income (below-average, average, and aboveaverage)
14
. Column 1 shows the results for the propensity to remit using a linear probability model. Our results suggest that sponsoring reduces the propensity to remit by 7.5 percentage points, which is same as the mean DD estimate. Therefore, our mean DD estimate on the propensity to remit is robust to inclusion of controls
15
. Column 2 presents the FD regression estimates for the average amount remitted. The results suggest that sponsoring leads to a reduction of $541.6 in the amount remitted. Again, the regression estimate is similar to the mean DD estimate. These results show the inference based on cross-sectional associations may give misleading results. In our analysis we combine the first categories and call it "below average". We also combine the last two categories and call it "above average". 15 We also estimated a regression where we restricted the sample to employed immigrants. The results (not reported here) are similar.
One concern with our approach may be that immigrants who intend to become citizens may behave differently than those who intend to return to their source countries. Therefore, we restrict our sample to those who intend to become U.S. citizens. As highlighted in the last two columns of Table 3 the estimates are similar to those we obtained for the final analysis sample.
Therefore, our previous discussion shows that sponsoring relatives leads to a decline in the propensity to remit and in the average amount remitted. This is consistent with the supposition of
Faini (2007).
We recognize that individual level characteristics (such as altruism) may create a spurious correlation between sponsorship and remittance. For example, if some individuals are more altruistic than others, then they will sponsor more relatives and also send more money in remittances, creating a positive association between sponsorship decision and remittance decision. The last two columns of Table 1a and 1b also suggest that the immigrants in comparison group is different from treatment group in demographic characteristics. This raises the possibility that they may be different in unobservable ways. If the unobservable differences were time-constant, our individual level fixed effect would be sufficient to get a consistent estimate. However, if they were time varying, then our DD-FE estimates may not be consistent.
We checked whether the sponsorship decision is endogenous using U.S. citizenship status as an instrument for immigrants' sponsorship decision. The U.S. immigration laws allow citizens to sponsor a broader group of immigrants compared to LPRs (see Jasso and Rosenzweig, 2010; Wasem, 2010b , for more detail) and therefore we should expect a strong first stage relationship, which is testable in the data. The F-stat for the excluded instrument is 18.46 suggesting that instrument is strong by conventional standards. LPRs, which suggests they are long-term immigrants. We checked whether our results are sensitive to excluding the respondents who indicated that they do not want to become U.S.
citizens. We again fail to reject the null of exogeneity (p-value is 0.38 in the propensity to remit equation and 0.98 in the amount remitted equation). IV estimates (not reported here but available on request) have same sign and similar in magnitude with DD results, but they are not statistically significant because of larger standard errors. If there is no endogeneity then both OLS and IV is consistent but IV is inefficient. Therefore, we prefer our DD results.
Education and Sponsorship Behaviour
Next, we will explore the relation between education and sponsorship behaviour using a linear probability model
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. In the regressions, we include a vector of individual level controls such as age, gender, number of years in the U.S., college education and so forth. Additionally, family structure variables such as whether the individual is married, has children, and has parents are also included. We also control for whether they have a spouse living abroad, any child living abroad, and any parent living abroad. In our data, education does not change for most immigrants 16 The details of amount remitted by each group not shown. 17 Marginal effects from a Probit model have similar results.
(average age at the time of the first interview is about 39 years) over time, and we do not have any suitable instruments. Therefore, we rely on OLS to estimate the association between education and sponsorship decision. All regressions include source country fixed effects 18 (along with the variables shown on Table 4 ). Results presented in column 1 of Table 4 show that immigrants who have a college degree are 1.79 per cent less likely to sponsor a relative compared to immigrants without a college degree. However, this coefficient is not significant. In column 2, we add immigrants' yearly income as an additional control and the coefficient of college remains negative but insignificant.
The negative association between education and sponsorship decision may happen if highly educated immigrants already have all of their close relatives in the U.S. and therefore they are less likely to sponsor anyone else. Next, to test this hypothesis, we create an interaction between whether an immigrant has a "close sponsor-able relative" (spouse, biological children, or parent) overseas and college degree. Column 3 shows the regression results. In column 3, since we include whether they have a "close sponsor-able relative" overseas, we do not include separate dummies for whether they have a spouse, children, or parent overseas. As expected, immigrants with a "close sponsor-able relative" overseas are 9.22 per cent more likely to sponsor compared to immigrants without a "close sponsor-able relative" overseas. However, the results also show that college graduates without a "close sponsor-able relative" are 1.53 per cent less likely to sponsor, and college graduates with a " close sponsor-able relative" are 6.82 per cent less likely (significant at 5% level) to sponsor
19
. Therefore, these results suggest that immigrants with a college degree have a lower propensity to sponsor when they have a "close sponsor-able relative" overseas.
Next, we explore the potential reasons behind this result. One potential explanation is that the relatives of college graduates have a higher opportunity cost of migrating to the U.S. presumably because they have jobs and/or property in their source countries. We do not have any direct evidence about the current opportunity cost of migration of their relatives. However, we do know the relative family income of the immigrants' families in their source countries when the immigrants were young (16 years old). If we assume that relative family income situation has not 18 For about 31 per cent of respondents in our sample the source country is not identified in the publicly available NIS data. In those cases, we use source region fixed effects. 19 We obtain this by testing the summation of coefficient of college and the interaction term.
changed substantially since then, we can use this variable as a proxy for the potential opportunity cost of migration for their family members. For example, members from a family with belowaverage income would have a lower opportunity cost of moving to the U.S. compared to members from a family with above-average income. Therefore, we create interactions for college degree and childhood family income. Column 4 of Table 5 presents the results. Results show that immigrants with college degree who come from an above-average income family are 5.95
percentage point less likely to sponsor. However, there is no significant association between college degree and sponsorship for immigrants from average or below-average income families.
These results suggest that the opportunity cost of migration of family members drives the relationship between college education and sponsorship.
Education and Remittances
Our results suggest immigrants (from above-average family income) with a college degree are less likely to sponsor family members. Furthermore, there is an inverse relationship between sponsorship and remittances. Therefore, college-educated immigrants may send more in remittances. In addition, this explanation also suggests that the more remittances sent by college educated immigrants are not simply driven by their higher income (that is as concluded by Bollard et al., 2011) , but also by the higher opportunity cost of migration of the family members of the college educated immigrants.
Next, we estimate the association between education and remittances. We report the regression results on extensive margin 20 (that is whether an immigrant remits or not), amount remitted (including zero remittances), and on intensive margin (amount remitted conditional on sending non-zero remittance). We present only the relevant coefficients in Table 5 (that is the coefficients of education) and the set of controls is same as those included in Column 5 and 6 suggest that immigrants with a college degree send $419.57 more in remittances compared to immigrants without a college degree, and they send $1,749 more conditional on sending non-zero remittance. Thus, our results suggest that the relation between education and remittance is positive and stable over time.
What Explains the Relation Between Education and Remittances?
To explore the plausibility of alternative hypotheses that may explain the observed positive association between education and remittances, we perform a series of tests. First, we re-estimate the regressions reported in Panel A of Table 6 shows the estimation results for the propensity to remit. The coefficient estimate of college for the immigrants without any U.S.
education is positive and significant (column 2), while the coefficient for immigrants with U.S.
education is negative but insignificant (column 1). Both rounds show the same pattern. Panel B
of Table 6 shows the estimation results for the amount remitted. In the sample of immigrants with U.S. education (column 1), those with a college degree send $472.6 more in remittances compared to immigrants without a college degree. On the other hand, in the sample of immigrants without any U.S. education (column 2), those with a college degree send $152.5 more in remittances compared to immigrants without a college degree. Both numbers are not statistically significant. In the second round (columns 3 and 4), the coefficients for immigrants without any U.S. education are significant.
Next, we further explore whether the higher remittances sent by college-educated immigrants represent a repayment of education loan offered by their source-country families. Our results so far suggest that it is unlikely to be the case. However, it may be that some of the immigrants may have acquired U.S. education while working in the U.S., or possibly after working for a while in the U.S. In those cases, they may not need financial support from their source-country families.
Immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as students (F-1 visa holders) may be more likely to use their source country family resources. Therefore, we are most likely to observe loan repayment among (former) F-1 visa holders. All regressions include full set of controls including income. Columns 1 and 2 present the results based on data from Round 1 and columns 3 and 4 present the results based on Round 2. Panel C of Table 6 shows the estimation results for the propensity to remit.
Results are similar to those reported in panel A. Panel D of Table 7 shows the estimation results for the amount remitted. Again, only the coefficients for immigrants who did not enter on F1 visa is significant (in Round 2). Therefore, overall results suggest that pure investment motive is unlikely to be the primary explanation for the association between education and remittances.
Conclusion
As more and more developed countries adopt skill-based immigration policies, their effect on developing countries remain unclear. This paper focuses on the possibility of a trigger effect of skill-based immigration policies on remittance flow and family-based migration. Conventional wisdom suggests that the relationship between education and remittances could be shaped by sponsorship behaviour. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that empirically investigates this issue. In this paper, we explore whether a relationship between sponsorship and remittance exists and whether that can explain the observed association between education and remittances. We use a DD estimator with individual (FE to estimate the effect of sponsorship on remittances. Our results suggest that sponsoring a relative leads to a $542 decline in the amount remitted per year. We show that college educated immigrants from above-average income families are less likely to sponsor relatives, suggesting that the opportunity cost of migration of their relatives is relatively high. Together, these two results suggest a positive association between education and remittances. Our extended analysis show that alternative explanations (such as higher income of more educated immigrants or repaying implicit educational loans)
cannot, by themselves, completely explain the positive association between education and remittances.
Our results have important policy implications. The results suggest that skill-based immigration policies (such as the proposed RAISE act) may have some unintended consequences. While the proposed goal of the RAISE act is to promote high-skilled migration and reduce total legal immigration, both of these will have an effect on remittance. First, The RAISE act proposes reducing the number of legal immigrants by half (from 1 million per year to 540,000 per year) by restricting family preferences to immediate family members and by eliminating diversity visas. Our estimates suggest that immigrants will send an additional $542 in remittances (since they will not be able to sponsor their extended family members), this will result in about $300 million in extra remittances from the U.S. However, this is the immediate impact. In the long run, as the stock of sponsorship-constrained immigrants grow, the effect of remittances will grow as well. In 20 years, the stock of sponsorship-constrained immigrants will grow to about 11 million. These individuals will send an additional $6 billion in remittances.
Second, currently about 28 per cent of immigrants are college educated
21
. Assuming that RAISE act (which will promote high-skilled immigration) will double the ratio to 56 per cent, this will result in an additional 3 million college graduates. Using our estimate that college graduates send about $349 more in remittances compared to those without a college degree, this will result in additional $1 billion in remittances. Therefore, the total amount of remittances may be $7 billion more under the RAISE act compared to the current scenario. To put this in perspective, in 2015 immigrants sent over $133 billion in remittances from the U.S. Therefore, the extra $7 billion will represent a 5.25 per cent increase in the amount remitted. Robust t statistics in parentheses * Significant at 10 per cent; ** Significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent Controls: college, yearly salary in thousands, marital status, whether they have a spouse overseas, number of children, whether they have children overseas, whether they have at least one living parent, and whether the living parent is overseas, gender, age, age squared, childhood family income below average, childhood family income above average, years since migration, years since migration squared, and a full list of country dummies Robust t statistics in parentheses * Significant at 10 per cent; ** Significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent. Controls: college, yearly salary in thousands, marital status, whether they have a spouse overseas, number of children, whether they have children overseas, whether they have at least one living parent, and whether the living parent is overseas, gender, age, age squared, childhood family income below average, childhood family income above average, years since migration, years since migration squared, and a full list of country dummies 
